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Abstract. The study aims to investigate the causes, external manifestations and impacts ofde-
risking phenomenon, increasingly rendered visible in the last years on international financial 
markets, under the circumstances of the post-crisis global economic developments. The paper 
reveals that this phenomenon is stilllittle discussed and understood by academics and institutional 
organizations, consequently, being ignored any theoretical foundation or arguments for the 
possible guidance, between one or other direction, of policies, norms and regulatory practices in 
order to monitor and addresstheslippages with adverse effects. In the paper,the stage of actual 
knowledge of this phenomenon, as concerns the differentforms in which comes out,  the main 
causes and factors of influence, the adverse impact observed and possible counteracting measures 
is presented. The analysis of the extent to which Romania is affected by de-risking, 
morevisibleby reducting thenumber of clients and financial transactions, halving the non-
performing loans of the banking system, having also an important social dimension, in the light 
of the low level of financial inclusion. The paper presents some reference pointsfor decoding this 
phenomenon, proposing new directions for more in-depth scientific researches,focusing on the 
identification of specific solutions based on customized analysis, including for Romania‟s 
case,considering the trade-off options, such as stability versus prudentiality in risk taking and risk 
management, profitability versus social responsibility under uncertainty conditions, banking 
system interestsversus interests of regulatory and supervisory institutions, monetary policies 
versus government policy and strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon called de-risking, which has recently emerged, at least as 
visible manifestation, entered almost by force,just 2-3 years ago, to the attention of 
researchers, academics, banking authorities and international and global 
institutions, has not reached a consensus on its definition. It seems that economics 
and, particularly, its financial branch, is facing yet again a deadlock, being 
constrained to react post-factum and trying to explain the fundamentals of 
aneventwhich was not included in its object of study and research, imposed by the 
new realities of globalization and international practices,situated outside its 
theoretical and methodological precepts.In our opinion, on the one hand, in terms 
ofa strict conceptual delimitation, the phenomenon could not be defined 
unambiguously in the absence of clear terms of reference: essence, features, 
external forms of manifestation, development, effects, benchmarks for evaluation. 
On the other hand, being expressed by anantinomian grammatical composition,e.g. 
associating the prefix de to the gerund risking, in economic terminology it may be 
included in the broader concept of risk management, meaning,per se, an exclusion 
of risks as sources of uncertainty. 
In other words, under the circumstances of compliance with the new 
financial standards of the post-crisis period, especially by the banking entities that 
operate globally and intermediate international financial transactions, this new 
approach implies, in practice, the formal improvement of risk management through 
avoidance or eliminationfrom the risk assessment system of potential threats, that 
are considered too likely to occur and bearingexcessive adverse effects, and/or 
whose prevention would be inefficient in terms of cost-benefit. 
Thus, according to the new pseudo-paradigm,lacking any theoretical support 
and macroeconomic or socialreliability, we are witnessing a reality of some 
financial servicesdecommittment, chaotic and totally opaque, contrary to the role 
and functions assumed by the banking system, as the claimedprinciples of 
sustainable development, inclusive growth and the broad access of the population 
to these financial services. The phenomenon,that became of global magnitude, 
hides, in fact, the conflict of interests between the financeindustry and the society 
as a whole, both at intra and inter-country levels, indirectly feeding the anti-
globalization movement. 
Looked at from a different angle, the meaning of the term de-risking can be 
associated to the one of deleveraging, which has had a wide circulation in the post-
crisis, withmuch clearer connotations, essentially meaning the reducing of risk 
exposure by withdrawing the credit lines from the geographic areas considered of 
high risk, as did the parent banks with their subsidiaries in Central and Eastern 
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Europe, it is true, in a controlled manner, as agreed according to Vienna Initiative 
in 2009 (Gattini, 2016, p. 92). 
Considering that, as concerns only the banking sector, the current rangeof de-
risking meaning covers a very broad area, from avoiding market / business risk and 
reputational risk, to defining any kind of financial services withdrawal, Erbenova et 
al. (2016, p. 3) argues, rightly, that the indiscriminational use of the term has led to 
misunderstandings and created confusion in the dialogue on determinants and 
trends of the phenomenon. 
In this article, having as objective a better understanding of de-risking 
essence, we intend to point out the main external manifestations of this 
phenomenon,several causes and influencing factors, a number of adverse effects 
and possible measures mitigating them, and how they particularly affected 
Romania. 
Our research tries, based on the current state of knowledge and an analytical 
approach, as much as it was possible, to investigate this phenomenon, looking for 
an answer, even incomplete, to the dilemma "how risky the de-risking is?". 
 
2. A worldwide phenomenon: external manifestations and determinants 
In the banking system, in practice, the phenomenon of de-risking manifests 
as financial transactions contraction, including the restricting the access to finance, 
reducing or eliminating exposures to a range of clients, individuals or legal entities 
and/or geographical areas, jurisdictions, sectors, services considered with high 
potential risks.In fact, the emergence of this phenomenon signifies a market failure, 
the banking sector trying to eliminate itsown weaknesses without taking into 
account the outside effects, mainly on economic and social development, which, for 
restoring the market mechanisms functionality and safeguarding the financial 
stability,requires an intervention by the national public authorities and international 
institutions. 
Among the external  manifestations of de-risking revealed by the literature 
and international institutions reports (Alier, 2016; Canuto & Ramcharan, 2016; 
Corazza, 2016; Erbenova et al. 2016; IMF, 2016; World Bank, 2015) are the 
reductionof corresponding banking relationships (CBRs), the restricting access to 
certain services related to financial transfers (Money Service Businesses-MSBs), 
the nonbanking market operators (Money Transfer Operators-MTOs), which 
mainly affectthe remittances. Also, according to a report by Goldman Sachs (2016), 
due to the introduction of a stricter risk management, thede-risking phenomenon 
can occur in the form of reducing credit exposures by lowering, through 
externalization, the  non-performing loans (NPL). 
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Recent studies issued by the World Bank (World Bank, 2015) revealed that, 
out of the 170 regional banks and small local banks included in the survey, about 
half reported a moderate or significant decline in CBRs
1
, and in the case of the 20 
large international banks, the share was about 75%. The main categories of causes 
raised by banks consisted, on the one hand, in business reasons (costs versus 
profitability) and, on the other hand, in the regulations and risks (systemic, 
operational, legal, reputational).  
As concerns  the correspondent banks, de-risking has reached also those 
headquartered in Europe, some of which having subsidiaries in Eastern Europe, 
including Romania. As found by a study of the European Central Bank (2015, p. 
5),under the circumstances of post-crisisdecreasing oftransactions with 
correspondent banks, severalEU large banksdiscarded some of these transactions, 
namely those recording low volume/significant value, due to the introduction in 
2014 of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). 
The Panama Papers scandal, which severely hit the global finance, showed 
how difficult it is for large banks to know exactly the origin of funds handled 
through correspondent banks and how they are used (Mendoza, 2016). It should be 
noted that the incidence of de-risking and the name of the banks involved are 
difficult to detect, due to concerns over reputational risk. The global banks does not 
officially notify such operations, but neither the affected correspondent banks are 
rushing to make them public, fearingto create a negative perception from 
customers. 
Also, as another influencing factor, the adoption of new rules during the 
post-crisis period (under Basel III Accords), focusing, inter alia, on the minimum 
capital requirements and increasing the provisions for assets held by international 
banks in correspondent banks, has reduced their lending capacity, impacting also 
on profitability indicators. 
In this context, it should be noted that financial services run by major banks 
through correspondent banks, are characterized, in general, by minor profit margins 
andlow volumes of transactions. All in all, it has become that the costs of 
compliance with the AML/CFT rules on combating money laundering and 
financing terrorism introduced by the intergovernmental body FATF (Financial 
                                                          
1Correspondent banking relationships are established on the basis of bilateral agreements 
according to which, typically, a large international  bank and a small regional/local bank are 
authorizing each other to provide financial services, generally payments to third parties, 
consisting particularly in crossborder trade related transactions, money transfers, short-term loans 
and investments and others; the local correspondent banks act as intermediaries,  substituting 
therefore the setting up of subsidiaries/branches by the international banks in the countries 
(jurisdictions) concerned (Bank for International Settlements, 2016 p . 9). 
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Action Task Force), including those related to conducting due diligences, increased 
by over 50% (International Finance Corporation, 2016, p. 2).  
 
These costs, in many cases,  exceeded the related benefits, which have led 
international banks to reduce or eliminate relations with those correspondent banks 
considered to beartoo high risks thereby to reward their managing (Artingstall et 
al., 2016, p. 14). 
As concerns other reasons for international banks decisions towards de-
risking, the fear of penalties and international/regional sanctions for potential 
infringement of those rules, which counted more than explicitly appear, are added. 
 
3. Adverse effects and possible countermeasures 
As long as the de-risking phenomenon is manifested essentially by reducing 
the access to financial services, it becomes clear that the very foundations of 
development areundermined, the investment loans, private and/or public, the 
international trade in goods and services and related transactions, including the 
value-added global chains, the flows of foreign direct investments, the private and 
institutional international transfers being afected (Erbenova et al., 2016). 
Direct and indirect effects on the international trade can be significant. A 
study of BIS (Bank for International Settlements, 2014, p. 45) revealed that about 
one third of the world trade, which reached 19 trillion dollars in 2014, is supported 
by trade finance instruments, intermediated, for the most part, by the international 
banks through a network of correspondent banks. They are asked, for example, to 
confirm payments to exporters (by documentary credit or letter of credit), based on 
documentation for the shipment of goods, supplying the lack of direct banking link 
between buyers and sellers. The de-risking phenomenonon CBR area deepens the  
deficit in trade financing, mainly affecting the underdeveloped or developing 
countries (Auboin & DiCaprio, 2017, p. 7), which may explain the weak 
recentdevelopments in the world trade, entered decline in 2015 (down about 10% 
compared to 2014). The de-risking implications on the world trade has been also 
pointed out by the  IMF Managing Director (2016, p. 8). 
Beside macroeconomic effects at the national and global level, there are 
adverse social costs, among other things, by restricting the consumer loans and 
remittances of expatriates, disadvantaged groups of the population being financially 
excluded. Most affected by this phenomenon, paradoxically, are those most in 
need, whether countries or companies, especially SMEs, or individuals from both, 
developing and advanced countries, and, as it has been revealed, even humanitarian 
organizations are hindered in carrying out their missions. 
Another paradox is that the de-risking phenomenon in the banking system, 
having as  main motivation the improvement of risk management, due, in fact, to 
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the elimination of risk sources, which, at macroeconomic level, may lead to the 
increase in financial and monetary instability, returning, ultimately, byfeedback 
loop, on the banking system itself,and to degenerate, through spillover effects on 
different transmission channels, in a global financial crisis.  
The risk of de-risking is also highlighted by diverting the financing means of 
those excluded to alternative credit providers as shadow banking, whose 
oversizedexpansion, out of any control,has been at the origin of the financial crisis 
in 2008, with dramatic global effects and on long term. 
The adverse effects of de-risking are asymmetric, by decoupling  whole 
regions from the global growth. The literature refers, as an example of regional 
imbalances, to the Caribbean as the most affected region by de-risking. Particularly 
to this area, located in the Caribbean Sea, is the small size of the states (islands) and 
the almost total dependence of foreign exchange receipts from tourism, exports and 
remittances, with the related financial operations conducted through correspondent 
accounts. At the annual meeting of central bank governors in the region under the 
CDB (Caribbean Development Bank) discussed the severity of the problems facing 
these countries, over which hangs the threat of a balance of payments crisis, the 
increase in external debt, weakeningthe financing of development projects, many of 
them requiring external payments for equipments imported, worsening the business 
environment (Canuto & Ramcharan, 2016). In fact, the CDB itself, whose activities 
are constrained by closing the correspondent accounts, most of tranzactions running 
into dollars, noting also that banks in the region are dependent on the US financial 
system, is affected by de-risking. 
As mentioned above, the adverse effects of de-risking that have emerged 
recently, have showed only its main source, e.g. the banking system, more precisely 
the international banks,but not having succeeded so farto drawa full picture of these 
effects at global level. Many studies or investigations of international organizations 
(in particular the IMF and World Bank) focusing on this research objective have 
provided only partial results orhave not been finalized yet.  
Other analyzes, including pilot studies,aimed at the assessment of de-risking 
side effects, on macroeconomic and/or social areas, are only at the stage of data 
collection, at least at the World Bank, the proposed measures to counter adverse 
effects, having rather atributesof recommendations (Corazza, 2016). 
Thus, these general recommendations refer to the prevention and mitigation 
of adverse effects by „freezing” de-risking actions pending the clarification of the 
essential aspects of the the phenomenon and the completion of various studies in 
progress atthe global level, taking into account the possibility of introducing global 
financial regulation standards, that allow, based on case by case risk-based 
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approach, the improvement of risk management, a faster intervention of central 
banks and regulatory authorities, as well as a better regional coordination of their 
actions (Canuto & Ramcharan, 2016). 
Other specific recommendations focus on providing assistance to facilitate 
compliance with AML/CFT regulations and reducing its costs, including through 
the SWIFT network, improving transparency regarding information on the 
origin/real beneficiary of cross-border financial transfers, setting a minimum limit 
for remittances under the AML/CFT regulations and settingdaily ceilings for the 
volume of transactions. 
Countries severely affected by de-risking through limiting their access to the 
global financial system, especially in CBR area, are advised that banking sector 
initiatives to be accompanied by the introduction of temporary mechanisms and 
alternative payment channels for international transactions, supported by state 
authorities, with the possible technical assistance from the IMF, if available thereof 
(Erbenova et al. 2016, p. 5; IMF, 2016, p. 5). 
Further on, it shall be attempting to identify several defining aspects of the 
de-risking presence in the banking system in Romania, as well as some adverse 
effects that can be assigned to it, at least to some extent. 
 
4. How is Romania affected by de-risking  
Under the circumstances of structural weaknesses inherent in the transition to 
a market economy and the accumulation of significant twin deficits (budgetary and 
BoP current account) during the pre-accession period, Romania has experienced the 
severe global crisis triggered in 2008, managing to maintain its financial stability 
only by receiving a financial support package from the IMF and EU, through a 
sovereign loan amounting to 20 billion euros. 
Although de-risking phenomenon has not been perceived, as such, at the 
global scale, it was present in Romania multifaceted forms during the post-crisis 
period. 
In the context of a banking sector dominated in a proportion of about 90% by 
the foreign capital, the deleveraging, albeit controlled, resulted in the withdrawal of 
credit lines by the  parent banks from their subsidiaries in Romania amounting to13 
billion euros over the period 2009-2015, which contributed, among other factors, to 
the contraction, in real terms, of bank lending in the post-crisis years. 
The reduction of the total number of retail clientsrepresents, although 
partially, another expression of the same de-risking phenomenon. In the case of  
Commercial Romanian Bank-Erste Group, the largest bank in the system, it lost 
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more than 1 million clients in the post-crisis period, but, with its remaining 2.8 
million clients in 2016,  is still ranked as the first among banks from this regard. 
The number of banking transactions with payment instructions hasdecreased 
(to below 210 million annually during the period 2009-2016, less by 20% 
compared to 2007) and the remittances have tended also to decrease (less than 4 
billion euros annually in the period 2009-2016, compared to amounts between 5 
and 7 billion euros in 2007 and 2008). 
All this can be considered defining aspects of the evolution of the banking 
system in Romania, partly attributable to the more or less significant impact of de-
risking. 
Further, the impact of de-risking on reducing bad loans and the low level of 
financial inclusion in Romania will be examined in a more analytical manner. 
4.1 De-risking and bad loans 
The non-performing loans (NPL) in the banking system in Romania followed 
an evolution in two phases: first, under the post-crisis impact, the NPL ratio 
recorded anincrease to over 20% of the total assets in the latter part of 2013 and 
early in 2014, after which, being also subject to de-risking, the ratio declined, 
falling below 10% at the end of 2016 (NBR, 2016, p. 58), taking into account the 
methodological changes introduced in 2014 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 The NPL ratio of Romania’s banking system during 2010-2016 
            -%- 
* Calculations based on reporting by all banks: both those using the standardised approach to 
assessing credit risk and those that use the internal ratings-based approach. 
** According to EBA definition, the non-perfoming exposures are those that meet any of the 
following criteria: i) significant exposure overdue more than 90 days; ii) it considers that, in the 
absence of the collateral execution, the borrower is unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full, 
regardless of the existence of any outstanding amounts or number of late payment days. Starting 
from June 2015, the non-performing exposures of cash balances in the central bank and other 
deposits held at credit institutions were included. 
Source: Monthly Bulletin, NBR, November, 2016, p. 58. 
Year 
NPL ratio 
according to NBR definition 
NPL ratio 
according to EBA definition **  
2016 - 9.46 
2015 - 13.51 
2014* 13.94 20.71 
2013 21.87 - 
2012 18.24 - 
2011 14.33 - 
2010 11.85 - 
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It should be noted that these ratios, especially at peak levels, were 
significantly above the alert thresholds recommended by the international financial 
institutions throughout the reference period, remaining currently slightly above 
them. It is worth mentioning that these NPL ratio thresholds ranges from 2-4%  
considered by the IMF to 8% envisaged by the European Banking Association 
(EBA), compared with an EU average of about 5.5% recorded in 2016. 
The halving of NPL ratio in just three years in the case of Romania is 
considered a good performance, appreciated among others, under Vienna Initiative, 
by EBRD experts (Montes-Negret & Cloutier, 2016), who showed that from this 
experience can be learned six lessons: data and information system accessible and 
reliable; positive role of the regulatory authority;insolvency framework consistent 
with the practices of restructuring;incentivizing tax structure for NPL trading; 
development of a debt market allowing banks partially deleveraging the NPL 
portfolio. 
A report of the European Investment Bank concerning the supervision of 
banking systems in Central and Eastern Europe also noted that, following the 
implementation of an action plan of the central bank in this regard
2
, the asset 
quality improved significantly in Romania, both in the corporate and the retail 
sectors (Gattini, 2016, pp. 91-98). 
According to a recent study by Deloitte (2017, pp. 7, 16, 31), Romania has 
proved the most active among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as 
concerns the liquidation of bad loans portfolio, with a total value of transactions of 
about 5 billion euro (representing almost 50% of the total NPL) during 2014 - 
2016, compared with Hungary (3.2 billion euros) and Poland (1.4 billion euros). 
However, the average sale prices of bad loans portfolios in Romania stood at a very 
low level (about 11%), half of those achieved by Czech Republic or Slovakia. 
If it is true that reducing the share of NPL help the improvement of assets 
quality and, thereby, the recovery of the banking system, in Romania's case the 
fundamental question is how it has been possible that alert thresholds being 
exceeded so much and for so long,without banking supervisory authority and the 
European institutions empowered to act only late, although in a radical manner. In 
our opinion, the reduction in NPL ratio by writing off  the portfolio of bad loans at 
derisory prices do not reflect a real recovery of the banking system in Romania, 
                                                          
2
 The NBR bad loans restructuring plan, implemented since 2014, has provided measures aimed 
to banksbalance sheets cleaning up throughwritting off provisioned NPLthat were deemed 
unrecoverable, salingthe uncovered NPL portfoliooverdue more than one year (except in 
bankruptcy or insolvency), removing NPL off balance and revaluation of collaterals at market 
value by external auditors. 
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being, materialized in financial losses suffered by banksin the years 2009-2014, in 
fact, as a result of hazardous credit policies during 2004-2008. 
This reduction, by the manner in which it occurred, is merely a form of de-
risking, with adverse effects outside the banking system, mainly by the decrease in 
lending, affecting the resources to finance the economy and reducing the number of 
customers, thus limiting companies and population access to financing. 
 
3.2 De-risking andfinancial inclusion 
By restricting access to certain categories of customers to financial services, 
including those to individuals, it is estimated that one of the biggest threats of de-
risking is to the financial inclusion (Artingstall et al., 2016, p. 15; Durner & 
Shetret, 2015, p. 21; Erbenova et al., 2016, p. 5). 
Under the circumstances of increasing concerns for reducing inequality and 
poverty in the world, the financial inclusion has become a global objective, being 
subjects of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the World Bank 
initiative on universal access to financial services (WB -Universal Financial Access 
2020), the G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI). Also, more than 
50 countries have launched national strategies for financial inclusion, with a 
roadmapstipulating concrete measures, supported by the allocation of necessary 
resources to implement them. 
The World Bank monitors the degree of financial inclusion globally by 
creating a database (Global Findex) that includes over 140 countries and more than 
100 indicators (Asli et al., 2015). As can be seen from the data presented in Table 
2, in 2014, the financial inclusion in Romania was at a low level, the majority of 
the selected indicators standing below the average of the country group to which it 
belongs (upper-middle income) according to the World Bank classification, and 
well below the average of OECD advanced countries. 
 
Table 2 Indicators of financial inclusion 
-% of population aged 15+- 
Indicators 
 
Romania Average of countries 
upper-middle income 
Average of countries  
OECD high-income 
Account held in a financial 
institution 
60.8 70.4 94.0 
Debit card 45.8 45.9 61.9 
Savings in the past year 13.3 32.2 51.6 
Creditin the past year 11.8 10.4 18.4 
Bills paid by internet  11.5 15.3 54.1 
Source: Data book on Financial Inclusion, Global Findex, World Bank, 2015, p. 122-125. 
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At EU level, the measurement of financial inclusion is done using a 
composite indicator, on a scale from 0 to 1, respectively FIS (Financial Inclusion 
Score) estimated based on the weighted average of a series of indicators on 
infrastructure financial services, including its quality, as well as to their use, the 
share of the adult population holding current and savings accounts, that takes 
consumer credits, or has life insurance. 
 
In the ranking of the degree of financial inclusion according to FIS, 
compared tocountries rated 1.00 (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland) and to an 
average score of 0.91 at EU level, Romania is ranked last with a score 0.554 
(European Commission, 2015, p. 5).  
 
In Romania, the low level of financial inclusion is explained, in addition to 
the large share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (37.3% according to 
Eurostat) that do not qualify for bank loans, in that,during  the period 2009-2015, a 
total of about 700 000 people (by 60% more than in 2008) were recorded as having 
late payments more than 30 days to Central Credit Risk, appearing on the black list 
of banks and being excluded from aplying for another credit. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The de-risking phenomenon has recently entered the attention of 
international financial institutions and researchers, particularly due to events 
emerged in the area of banking, having adverse macroeconomic and social effects 
and being perceived increasingly more as a global threat, constituting, by itself, a 
major risk factor. 
The main difficulty encountered by the attempts to prevent and counteract 
these adverse effects is caused by the lack of a proper assessment of the de-risking 
impact, given insufficient data and inability of separating the cause-effect relation 
on the alignment of various forms and complex event phenomenon, the multitude 
of involved actors and the conflict, most often hidden, between the interests of the 
banking system, dominated by global banks, and those of national and international 
institutions and society as a whole.  
The banking system, which gather most causes of de-risking is facing with 
extremely difficulttrade-off options, each of which havingassociated a particular set 
of costs and benefits, variable in time and space, under the pressure of fitting the 
stability/prudential standards versus risk taking,under a complex of interdependent 
conditions andhigh uncertainty, and the achievement of the banktop management 
performance indicators. 
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Given the early stage of researcheson de-risking phenomenon, while 
following the global studies, especially of the IMF and World Bank, aimed at 
clarifying the key issues and assessing the implications of this phenomenon to their 
real dimension, for Romania, which, as revealed in this paper, is also affected, more 
severe in terms of financial inclusion, is important that regulatory and supervision 
authorities of financial markets (mainly NBR andFSA), which have basic 
information and specific data, to start a customized analysis, in order to identify 
particular solutions to mitigate the adverse effects of de-risking for our country. 
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